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The Main Problems in the Relations Between 
the European Union and Turkey
Abstract
This paper depicts the dynamics of the EU-Turkey relations beginning 
from the signing of the association agreement, i.e. the Ankara contract, 
to date. In addition, it aims to specify the factors preventing the bilateral 
collaboration and achievement of EU membership as aspired to by 
Ankara. 
The paper focuses on both the internal and international problems arising 
on Turkey’s path to EU membership, namely, the westernisation trend 
originating from Kemal Ataturk times, recent developments in Turkey, 
the democratisation of political institutions, the rule of law and protection 
of human rights, regional security, Turkey’s part in the refugee crisis, visa-
free travel, Greek-Turkey relationships, Ankara’s stance towards Cyprus, 
the Kurdish problem, and the Turkey-US and Turkey-Russia relationships. 
The authors discuss the EU Member States’ attitude towards the political 
and socio-economic developments in Turkey and the way Ankara looks at 
the requirements put forward by those Member States. We suggest several 
methods of rapprochement and brighter bilateral prospects. 
Key words: Turkey, European Union, Relations, Membership
Introduction 
Today, international relationships in Europe are hardly imaginable 
without shared values and relations with the EU. 
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Georgia’s westernisation has been the call of the day since the end of 
the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nearly two decades 
of EU-Georgia collaboration ended with the signing of the Association 
Treaty. Understandingly, in this context the experience of the other states, 
including Turkey, a neighbouring country and Georgia’s strategic partner 
and a regional power, is of interest. Regardless of different historical 
backgrounds, given the regional developments, the issue is worth 
investigating; Turkey an important player in the international arena 
largely due to its location on the crossroads between the two continents 
and its vicinity to oil rich regions, the Caucasus and Middle East and 
also due to the fact that it has the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits on its 
territory.
The Republic of Turkey, with just 3% of its territory situated in Europe, 
is not an EU Member State although it executed the Association Treaty 
with EEC as early as 1963. This paper focuses on the dynamics of the 
Turkey-EU relationship, the problems and the views regarding the ways 
they may be settled in. 
There are several other reasons as to why the issue is worth dealing with: 
the long-standing EU-Turkey relationships and Ankara’s long drawn-out 
integration into the European Union prevented by largely the situation 
in the country – the slow development of the democratic institutions, the 
human rights problem, Turkey’s part in the refugee crisis, visa-free travel, 
the Greece-Turkey relationship, Ankara’s stance towards Cyprus, the 
Kurdish problem, and the Turkey-US and Turkey-Russia relationships.1 
The authors discuss the EU Member States’ attitude towards the political 
and socio-economic developments in Turkey and the way Ankara looks at 
the requirements put forward by those states. We suggest several methods 
of rapprochement and brighter bilateral prospects.
Turkey-EU: Historic Background
In his study “Turkey and Europe in History”, Halil Inalcık, the 
prominent Turkish historian, speaks about the beginnings of Turkish-
European relations dating back to XV–XVI cc.2 However, the aspiration 
to join Europe gained ground 100 years ago, when westernisation was 
1  See more: Turkey and Europe, ed. A. Szymański, The Polish Institute of Inter-
national Relations, Warsaw 2012; A. Adamczyk, The Infl uence of Turkey’s International 
Problems upon the Process of Its Integration with the European Union, in: Poland and 
Turkey in Europe – Social, Economic and Political Experiences and Challenges, Warsaw 
2014, pp. 373–403.
2  H. Inalcik, Turkey and Europe in History, Istanbul 2016, pp. 178–194.
155
G. Chelidze, E. Machitidze, The Main Problems in the Relations…
declared the uppermost principle of joining the European community of 
nations.3 The trend is still strong regardless of the Turkish secular circles’ 
view about the “Erosion of Atatürk’s legacy, which poses a threat to the 
policy of westernisation”.4 As Mr. Ahmed Davutoğlu, the Turkish Foreign 
Secretary between 2009–2014 and later the leader of the ruling Justice 
and Development Party said, “For Turkey, integration into Europe is 
a strategic choice and one of the most important projects”.5 However, the 
road to the EU has been pretty bumpy. Despite its Association Treaty 
with the EEC of 1963 and the Turkey-EU Customs Union of 1996, Turkey 
has been unable to achieve its ultimate goal of attaining EU membership. 
Ankara’s application for EU membership – fi led in 1987 during the 
Premiership of Mr. Turgut Özal – is still unsatisfi ed. Also, at the time, 
Turkish citizens were allowed to fi le individual claims to the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Parliament ratifi ed the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture, and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.6 The second stage of Turkey-EU relations 
should be of interest for it was in December 1997 that the basics and dates 
of the EU expansion were defi ned at the Luxembourg summit. However, 
Turkey was sidelined from the expansion process. At the Helsinki summit 
in 1999, Turkey was granted the “candidate country” status and given 
access to “the strategy of achieving full-scale participation”, i.e. similarly 
to the other aspirant states, carry out the reforms to make the country’s 
political and economic institutions comply with the EU standards.7 
The candidate-country status made Ankara hopeful that relations with 
Europe would take a better turn,8 all the more so that between 1995–2004, 
the EU issued 1bn euros to fund consultative and translation services, 
the education system, seminars, forums etc.9 However, even negotiations 
launched in 2005 came to nothing.
3  M. Komakhia, Turqet-evrokavshiris urtiertoba, Saqartvelos strategiuli kvlevebisa da 
ganvitarebis centri, „Biuleteni”, no. 41/2000 August, p. 2.
4  R. Gachechiladze, Saqartvelo msoplio konteqstshi: XX da XXI saukuneebis politi-
kuri ckhovrebis ziritadi momentebi, Tbilisi 2017, p. 596.
5  B. Davutoğlu, AB’ye üyelik stratejik tercih olmaya devam ediyor [Elektronik kay-
nak] // AB Haber ve Politika Portalı [Resmi Kaynak], 10.05.2013, http://www.euractiv.
com.tr/yazici-sayfasi/article/davutoglu-abye-uyelik-stratejik-tercih-olmaya-devam-
ediyor-027749 (access 9.03.2021).
6  C.V. Findley, Modern Türkiye Tarihi, İstanbul 2011, p. 356.
7  A. Gadjiev, Process Vstuplenia Turcii v ES I Kopengagenskie kriterii, Sovremennaia 
Turcia: Problemi i Reshenia, Sbornik, Moskva 2006, p. 124.
8  M. Komakhia, op.cit., pp. 2–4.
9  A. Gadjiev, op.cit., p. 129.
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The key problem should be putting the Copenhagen criteria into 
practice. In “The regular Report on Turkey’s Progress”, “political criteria” 
were set out by way of 5 issues: which laws did the Turkish parliament 
adopt according to EU criteria; which bill did the Government prepare 
in compliance with the EU laws; to what extent are the powers of the 
Turkish military restricted, had the judiciary been reformed, and whether 
the fi ght against corruption had been institutionalised, and namely what 
legal and administrative acts had been enacted.10 Here we should also 
mention “the state governance reform package” wherein in its report, the 
EU leadership stated that if it was successfully implemented in Turkey’s 
administrative and political system, signifi cant steps would be taken 
towards modernisation of “Turkey’s administration culture”.11 Besides, 
there were requirements for each candidate country to meet which was 
crucial for the EU approach to it. Those defi ned for Turkey by the 1999 
Helsinki summit obliged it to peacefully solve the border issues and settle 
relations with Cyprus. 
Ankara was repeatedly told by Brussels that it did not comply with the 
“Copenhagen criteria”.12 In September 2006, the European Parliament 
voted for the report that Turkey’s progress towards the freedom of 
expression, minority rights, corruption combat and violence against 
women was insuffi cient. In November of that year, the Commission 
published a critical report concerning Turkey’s compliance with the EU 
standards, saying that the border problems and relations with Cyprus 
remained unsolved. Many Turks believed that the EU’s attitude to their 
country was too stringent, biased, and that it was just a “pretext”13 which 
had nothing to do with the named problems but portrayed a civilisational 
difference. It should be said, though, that the “creation of the Customs 
Union marked a signifi cant step towards rapprochement between the two. 
The European states were trying to show the Islamic world that religious 
differences did not create obstacles to integration”.14
In the mid 1990s, Turkey turned its gaze towards the development of 
democracy, human rights, and civil society important in its further relations 
with Europe. Turkey’s EU membership also mattered; on the one hand, 
10  Ibidem, p. 130.
11  2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, COM(2004) 656 
fi nal, Brussels, 6.10.2004, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/
near/fi les/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf (access 10.03.2021).
12  R. Gachechiladze, op.cit., p. 599.
13  The activity of the EU and its mechanism of spreading democracy named “Con-
ditionality” is highly actual today in Political Science and International Relations.
14  M. Komakhia, op.cit., p. 5.
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as a NATO member state, it was closely involved in the liquidation of the 
Soviet legacy and on the other, strived for participation in the creation of 
the new political architecture in Europe.15 And yet, by 2000, Turkey’s EU 
membership, i.e. the “Copenhagen criteria”, prevented its integration with 
Europe. Turkey’s potential to share EU political and economic standards 
was disregarded, which prompted Ankara’s claim about its discrimination 
and the EU’s failure to apply the same criteria to all the candidate states. 
According to the 2003 poll taken by the Turkish Association for Social and 
Economic Studies, 62% of Turks believed that the EU was unfair to their 
country since the conditions it applied to Turkey were different from those 
set for the other candidate states.16 In the wake of the Cold War, political 
priorities in the EU changed as demonstrated by the admission of the 
Central and Eastern European countries, while Turkey was pushed back. 
The Kurds’ and Cyprus issues still remained at the top of the agenda. 
Relations in the Last Decade – 
The Main Obstacles on Turkey’s Path to the EU
At the fi rst Turkey-EU summit in Brussels on 29 November 2015, the 
parties agreed to rekindle its EU membership process. To this end, several 
hot issues were singled out for Ankara to work on:
1.  A galvanisation of the EU membership talks;
2.  Regular Turkey-EU summits to discuss critical issues;
3.  Acceleration of the free-travel dialogue;
4.  The drawing up and implementation of an action plan;
5.  Refugee shelters;
6.  The resumption of the Customs Union.17
In 2015–2016, the Turkey-EU talks intensifi ed but were halted by an 
attempted military coup on 15 July 2016, the Government’s harsh response 
and suspension of fi nancial aid by the EU in the wake of that response. In 
2019, the European Parliament suspended talks with Ankara. From this 
perspective, while assessing the Turkey-EU relations we should focus on 
the problems emerging in the bilateral negotiations:
15  Ibidem, p. 5.
16  U. Kudriashova, Perspektivi Dalneishego Sblijenia Turcii s Evropeiskim Souzom 
I Ego Posledstvia Dlia Rossii (Перспективы Дальнейшего Сближения Турции с Ев-
ропейским Союзом и его последствия для России), „Востоковедный Сборник”, 
no. 8/2007, p. 113.
17  Türkiye-AB Zirvesi Bugün Brüksel’de Gerçekleştirildi, 2 December 2015, Retrie-
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− the 15 July 2016 attempted military coup and the subsequent 
developments;
− deteriorated relations with the US, which worsened the economic 
situation in Turkey;
− establishment of close political ties with Russia;
− Ankara’s request to reform the UN Security Council;
−  developments in terms of the Turkish-Greek relations.
In 2018, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was reelected President. At the same 
time, the Parliament adopted the Constitutional amendment envisaging 
Turkey’s transformation from a Parliamentary to a Presidential Republic. 
Here we should say that in recent years, problems concerning the 
management of the refugee crisis and the aforementioned attempted 
military coup in July 2016 emerged in the EU-Ankara relations. Namely, 
Europe expressed concern about the increased Presidential powers, the 
crackdown on dissent, the restrictions imposed on the freedom of expression 
and the Media, the referendum on the Constitutional amendment and 
the appointment of the early Presidential and Parliamentary polls. On 
his part, President Erdoğan voiced his concern about the West’s negative 
attitude towards his policies and established closer ties with Russia in 
connection with the war in Syria and his wish to acquire weaponry. While 
the EU Member States debate over the termination of talks with Turkey, 
the negotiations continue. Many States support continued economic 
relations as an alternative to Turkey’s EU membership. They also suppose 
that the Brexit model could be applied to Ankara. For all the hurdles, EU 
membership, which is likely to boost the potential of the reforms and the 
dialogue on a common standard, especially so in terms of human rights, 
remains both sides’ ultimate goal. 
A closer look at the developments in recent years demonstrates 
that the public in Istanbul and Ankara stood up against an attempted 
military coup of 15 July 2016 staged by a group of offi cers looking to 
seize power. Responding to EU and NATO condemnation of Ankara’s 
actions in the wake of the failed coup, the Turkish Government expressed 
disappointment; describing it as an attack against Turkey’s democratically 
elected Government and bemoaning the lack of support from the EU and 
NATO. The EU reacted negatively against Erdoğan’s statements about 
the reintroduction of the death sentence which had been abolished in 
2004, the introduction of emergency rule and the persecution of innocent 
people, including the younger generation. The Turkish Government 
imposed a strict control over the Media, curbed social media and the 
Internet, closed down opposition newspapers and limited the freedom 
of expression. According to the Freedom House report, it was between 
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2015–2018 when EU-Turkey relations worsened radically. A 16 April 2017 
referendum on the Constitutional amendments came up as a response to 
the attempted coup. The amendments expanded Presidential powers and 
transformed the country from a Parliamentary to a Presidential Republic. 
An OSCE Observer Mission criticised the referendum organisers for 
limited public discussions and the restriction of the other candidates’ 
opportunities to wage their campaigns in the run-up to the 2018 
Presidential poll. The Justice and Restoration Party came out the winner 
of the early Parliamentary and Presidential election on 24 June 2018 
and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected President. The Constitutional 
amendments were enacted and Turkey became a Presidential Republic. 
On 25 July 2018, the Parliament approved a counter-terrorism package 
envisaging certain restrictions, which frustrated the Opposition. As a result 
of the Constitutional amendment, Turkey shifted from the European 
government model and, understandably, complicated its relations with 
the EU.18
Turkey-EU relations were also infl uenced by the crisis of the Turkish 
lira. Ankara refused to release Andrew Brenson, an American pastor 
suspected of being involved with the developments of 2016, from prison. 
Washington responded with increased tariffs on the metals imported from 
Turkey and imposed fi nancial sanctions on some Turkish high offi cials. 
The US-Turkey stand-off poses a certain threat to the implementation of 
some major projects (a new airport and “the Istanbul Canal” to operate 
along with the Strait of Bosporus), the key issue in Erdoğan’s pre-election 
program, which aimed at heightening Ankara’s profi le in the run-up to the 
100 year anniversary since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. 
It should be said that the uncertainty and distrust characteristic 
to US-Turkey relations are unlikely to disappear any time soon.19 
However, the settled bilateral ties are extremely important in terms of 
the implementation of the major projects similar to the ones mentioned 
above. In this regard, it is enough to remember that due to the situation in 
the region and Washington’s pragmatic military policies, Turkey received 
considerable US military and economic aid in the 1980’s, with which to 
support its further economic advancement.20
The question which arises in the discussion on the EU-Turkey 
relationship is whether there have been any changes within the alliances. 
18  Z. Batiashvili, Cvlilebebi turqetis mmartvelobis sistemashi, eqspertis azri, 107, Tbilisi 
2018, p. 13.
19  E. Makaradze, Turqetis istoria 1918–2018 clebsi, Tbilisi 2019, p. 276.
20  E. Machitidze, 1980-iani clebis turqeti da amerikis seertebuli statebi, narkvevebi 
turqetis istoriidan, Tbilisi 2018, p. 206.
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In recent years, Turkey has been sending somewhat mixed signals about 
its collaboration with NATO and the EU membership issue. Turkey relied 
on NATO support in averting Russian threats as one of their F-16 fi ghter 
jets shot down a Russian plane. However, with the deterioration of US-
Turkish relations, President Erdoğan became vociferous about his close 
ties with Russian high offi cials and even made an attempt at procuring 
military equipment. It should be said, though, that rapprochement has 
been made possible by the geo-political situation, gradual estrangement 
from the West and also an ideological shift as the Justice and Development 
Party came to power.
By forging close ties with Moscow, Ankara seeks for stronger infl uence 
on Syria’s prospects. As to Washington’s attitude towards the Turkish-
Russian military cooperation, it is understandingly negative. The US 
and some of the NATO member states backed up the Kurdish military 
formations in northern Syria and stood against the creation of a buffer 
zone along the Turkish-Syrian border, which allowed approx. 3 mln 
refugees to leave Turkey. Ankara supported Iran and Russia in the Syrian 
war and even participated in tri-partite negotiations.
In the last 15 years, Turkey has been trying to direct its political 
vector to Central Asia and Azerbaijan, where it has very strong cultural 
ties. It boosted its presence in the Organization for Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC), and hosted its summit in 2016 during which Ankara accused the 
West of double standards where Muslims are concerned. Similarly to the 
other G-20 member-states, for instance Brazil, it called for UN reform, 
especially so of the United Nations Security Council with its permanent 
seats that President Erdoğan described as “a one-sided system”. He voiced 
his concern that none of the Islamic States were represented in the United 
Nations Security Council and expressed support to the system that would 
involve all the continents and religions. Neither the EU, nor England 
or France – permanent Security Council members – made their stance 
public regarding the issue.
Turkey is a NATO and a CoE member-state and the EU has strong 
trade interests there. Therefore, both the West and Ankara have taken 
a common stance with regard to two problems: Syria and terrorism combat 
in the region. The CoE gave a green light to the European Commission 
with regard to the latter problem, so the European Parliament is going to 
boost collaboration with Turkey not only in the fi ght against terrorism, 
but data sharing as well. Although in April 2016, Turkey signed the Paris 
treaty on climate change, Ankara’s stance is not quite clear-cut and Turkish 
diplomats have repeatedly asked for a discussion on their country’s stance 
in view of “special circumstances”.
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Given the political situation in Turkey at the time, European leaders 
started thinking whether to continue debates over its admission to 
the EU, with some of the key players sounding pessimistic. In 2017, 
German Foreign Secretary Sigmar Gabriel claimed that due to a possible 
reintroduction of the death penalty in Turkey and the ungrounded 
detention of German citizens there, the earlier peaceful relations with 
Brussels could come to an end one day.21 It also became evident that along 
with Germany, neither France nor the Netherlands would have liked the 
annual NATO summit to be held in Istanbul in 2018, which was more 
evidence of EU-Turkey tensions. However, they agreed with some of the 
other states saying that talks with Ankara should go on in order to bring 
Turkey closer to the European values and living standards. In their words, 
despite slow progress, the negotiations should be regarded as an impetus 
to further development. We suppose that modernisation of the Customs 
Union in 2015, supposedly an alternative to Turkey’s EU membership, is 
actually only a part of it. Speaking within the context, the refugee crisis 
and Ankara’s part in its management, as well as possible visa-free travel 
should be considered a step forward towards EU membership. It was 
via Turkey that the refugees arrived in the EU, and Ankara has played 
a major role in the deterrence of migrants. In March 2016, Ankara agreed 
to return illegal migrants reaching the EU via Turkey unless they needed 
international support. This is an important point, since it had been 
because of the soaring numbers of migrants from the Middle East and 
North Africa to Europe that prompted the EU to conclude an agreement 
on the refugee crisis with Ankara in March 2016. As is well known, by 
signing the agreement, Turkey assumed an obligation to deter migrants 
on its territory on several conditions. Those included, but were not 
limited to, the allocation of 3bn euros by the EU for accommodation of 
the migrants, the acceleration of EU membership and visa-free travel for 
Turkish citizens as early as the end of 2016. The agreement signifi cantly 
curbed the refugee infl ux into the EU states for which they allotted 677m 
euros. However, due to the developments in Turkey, the EU did not meet 
the other conditions.22 Ankara’s call for a revision of the agreement on 
migrants further complicated the situation. Turkish government offi cials 
referred to the changed circumstances since 2016 and requested free 
travel and an improvement of the Customs Treaty. They grounded their 
demands on the fact that there were approximately 3.5 million migrants 
in their country at the time and emphasised President Erdoğan’s proposal 
to create safety zones in Syria and the return of the refugees. It may be 
21  https://imedinews.ge (access 10.03.2021).
22  https://1tv.ge/analytics/turqetis-evropuli-perspeqtivis-daisi/ (access 10.03.2021).
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said that Turkey took on one of the biggest challenges facing Europe and 
contributed signifi cantly to international efforts. Not only is it hosting 
3.5 million Syrian refugees, but it has also prevented their arrival in 
Western Europe by the thousands via the hazardous route across the 
Aegean Sea.
However, on 27 February 2020, President Erdogan stated that the 
Government was no longer going to bar Syrian refugees’ infl ux into 
Europe, all the more so that 33 Turkish servicemen had been killed in 
Idlib by the Syrian regime. Incidentally, he also remarked that the Greek 
border was open. His remark did not come up as totally unanticipated 
for as early as 2018, experts said that the “Turkish leaders continuously 
threatened Brussels with the prospect of unsealing the border” and that 
“the EU decision-makers were wavering over the prospect of lifting 
visas“.23 Ankara’s steps resulted in the concentration of around 12,500 
refugees on the Turkish-Greek border. The situation was aggravated by 
Athens’s protest against Ankara’s allegations that the Greeks had shot 
a refugee trying to cross the border. The EU warned Turkey that „Illegal 
crossings will not be tolerated. In this regard, the EU and its member 
states will take all necessary measures, in accordance with EU and 
international law... Migrants should not be encouraged to endanger their 
lives by attempting illegal crossings by land or sea”.24 
The EU Interior Ministers’ meeting in Brussels claimed that Ankara 
was exploiting the refugee problem for political reasons. Mr. Charles 
Michel, President of the European Council and Mr. Josep Borrell, the 
EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, got closely involved in solving the issue. However, President 
Erdogan maintained a rigid stance, saying that Ankara was not going 
to revise the refugee agreement with Europe until the EU supported its 
military inroads in Syria, something that the French Foreign Secretary 
described as “blackmail”. We agree with Mr. Borrell’s view that opening 
European borders would seriously undermine the EU’s trust in Turkey. 
Turkey should remain true to its obligation under the 2016 Agreement 
between Brussels and Ankara. We believe that Ankara should reconsider 
its position where the issue is concerned.
The concept of the so-called “new orbit”, i.e. a common status for 
Turkey and Britain, is of interest, too. On 23 June 2016, when Britain 
declared its intention to leave the EU, the latter had been considering 
23  L. Haferlach, F. Tekin, J. Wódka, Friends. Foes. Frenemies? Unpacking the future 
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stepping up relations with Ankara to compensate for Brexit, but changed 
its policies because of President Erdoğan’s harsh response to the dissent.
Incidentally, in his “History of Turkey” published back in 2007, Michael 
Svanidze pointed out the rapid increase of the population as a negative 
factor in terms of Turkey’s EU membership: if admitted, it would have 
been the most populous EU state, with its parliamentary quota equal or 
perhaps even larger than that of the key EU countries.25 Considering that 
Turkey’s population is about 84 million today, it is a signifi cant factor in 
terms of its EU membership.26 Quite a few authors say that “Europe is 
to be concerned by Turkey’s demographic potential and a rapid natural 
growth of its population”.27 They also point at the religious, cultural, and 
linguistic differences.28
The EU sanctions imposed on Ankara in 2020 for the unsanctioned 
exploitation of natural resources in the eastern Mediterranean added to 
the problem. The tensions increased in August when Ankara sent a ship 
for natural gas reconnaissance in the waters that Greece regarded its own. 
A Turkish-Greek dispute over drilling rights fl ared. EU sanctions were 
applied to the companies responsible for drilling in the disputed waters 
of the Mediterranean Sea. Ankara brushed aside the economic sanctions, 
saying that the EU was being unfair towards Turkey for aspiring for its 
membership and that the Union’s claim that it was escalating tensions 
was false. Ankara requested improved relations on the grounds of its full 
EU membership. A telephone conversation between Turkish President 
Erdoğan and the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, 
as well a meeting in Brussels between Turkey’s Foreign Secretary Mevlüt 
Çavuşoğlu and Mr. Josep Borrell, the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs 
during which the European offi cial said that the EU had a strategic interest 
in developing cooperative and mutually benefi cial relations, generated 
some hope. The meeting made a candid and exhaustive exchange of 
opinions possible. The sides welcomed the CE’s decision in December to 
submit a report on the status of the EU-Turkey’s political, economic, and 
trade ties and their prospects.29 As the Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt 
Çavuşoğlu said, ”2020 was problematic in terms of EU-Turkey relations 
25  M. Svanidze, turqetis istoria, Tbilisi 2007, p. 543. 
26  https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/turkey-population/ (access 
10.03.2021).
27  R. Gachechiladze, op.cit., p. 600.
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but the dialogue took a more positive turn after the European leaders’ 
meeting in December. Turkey is always ready for relations with any party 
or institution that will stretch out a positive hand”, adding that his country 
was keeping its promise; “However, only one side’s wish or loyalty is not 
suffi cient where bilateral relations are concerned. I’d like to say that in 
the conversations with my colleagues I saw a very positive attitude and 
the wish to improve our relations”.30 Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 
expressed hope that Turkey’s admission process would continue, adding 
that Ankara was ready for further negotiations to meet EU criteria.31 Here 
we should mention the European Commission’s 2020 report on Turkey 
that states: “Regarding its ability to assume its obligations of membership, 
Turkey has continued to align with the EU acquis, albeit at a very limited 
pace and in a fragmented manner. There continued to be instances of 
backsliding regarding a number of key aspects in the areas of competition 
on account of an increase in State aid and its lack of transparency, 
information society and media, economic and monetary policy, customs 
union, external relations and foreign, security and defence policy. 
Turkey is well advanced in the areas of company law, trans-European 
network and science and research, and it has also achieved a good level of 
preparation in a number of areas, including the free movement of goods, 
intellectual property law, fi nancial services, and enterprise and industrial 
policy. Turkey is also moderately well prepared on public procurement 
despite the fact that important gaps remain in its alignment. Turkey 
is also relatively well prepared in areas such as the free movement of 
capital, transport policy, energy, taxation, economic and monetary union, 
statistics, where further signifi cant efforts are needed across the board. 
Overall, more ambitious and more coordination policies still need to be 
established and implemented. In all areas, more attention needs to be 
given to enforce legislation whilst many areas require further signifi cant 
progress to achieve legislative alignment with the EU acquis, to strengthen 
the independence of regulatory authorities, and to build administrative 
capacities”.32 It also has to be kept in mind that: “The fi rst half of 2020 
has been marked by the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The EU redirected EU funds worth 83 million to support the COVID-19 




32  Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2020 Report, Brussels, 
6.10.2020, p. 9, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/fi les/tur-
key_report_2020.pdf (access 10.03.2021).
165
G. Chelidze, E. Machitidze, The Main Problems in the Relations…
extended implementing periods for some IPA programs. In the context 
of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, the Commission immediately 
launched awareness raising activities for the refugee population who are 
among the most vulnerable people. An agreement was reached with the 
Turkish government to mobilize savings and contingencies under the 
Facility to support the national COVID-19 response”.33 Apparently, the 
fi ght against the pandemic has also infl uenced the further development of 
bilateral relations, which is of course the right approach.
Prof. İrfan Kaya Ülger of Kocaeli University expressed an interesting 
view on the current Turkey–EU relations: “Turkey’s ambition for EU 
membership is right. Historically speaking, the West has been infl uential 
in the improvement of democracy and basic rights and freedom in 
Turkey. For instance, Turkey’s transformation to a multi-party regime in 
1946 occurred under the pressure of the European Council. Likewise, the 
increase in Turkey’s prosperity also became possible thanks to its close 
ties with the EU. The Custom Union Treaty of 1996 between Turkey 
and the EU boosted the fl ow of foreign direct investment to Turkey and 
hence increased the per capita income. Turkey is right in thinking that 
the EU wouldn’t allow it in anyway. Uncertainty on Turkey’s membership 
seems to have been derived from the EU. Yet, the situation is a bit more 
complicated”.34 We share Prof. Dr. İrfan Kaya Ülger’s views based on the 
historical context of the EU-Turkey relations. He speaks about the EU free 
trade agreement (ESTA), which will support the free movement of goods, 
services, capital, and people between Turkey and the EU.35 Regardless of 
the EU’s cautious approach, “Turkey has become a regional power to be 
reckoned with, but its international agenda is not well aligned with the 
EU’s and its methods are not those of the EU”.36 “Mutual expectations 
from the 2016 EU-Turkey Joint Statement, which followed the outbreak 
of the migration crisis of 2015 had not borne fruit”.37 We suppose that the 
2020 dynamics of the developments create positive expectations where 
the Turkey-EU prospects are concerned. The fact that “…the EU will be 
unable to achieve stability on the Continent unless it balances its relations 
with Turkey also generates hope”.38 It is but logical since the European 
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integration had been prompted by the need to prevent confl icts on the 
Continent.
Conclusions – Prospects of Turkey’s EU Membership 
A state directs its international relations on the basis of its national and 
common interests and relies on them in its international dealings. This is 
also true for Turkey and the EU. The progress of Turkey-EU relations is 
a long-term affair. Ankara still has a long way to go to join the EU.39 Progress 
will largely depend on the international economic and political situation, as 
well as the Turkish Government’s readiness to implement European values 
and legal reforms. The following is relevant to Turkey’s westernisation: 
The goal of EU membership set decades ago remains the same as it is still 
important to both sides and a merely single step, and not even economic 
integration, is not going to create equal opportunities for either the EU 
or Turkey. Although Turkey’s integration into the EU has slowed down, 
it is not at a standstill, and for both those in Europe and Turkey it is not 
considered against the background of the past but the future.40 
Turkey is a signatory to the CoE Constituent and the European Human 
Rights Convention, which guarantees the respect of the people’s personal 
rights both in European countries and in Turkey. Therefore, we may 
presume that with time, human rights are going to be as respected in 
Turkey as they are in all European states, and all the more so considering 
that the westernised Turkish population is quite numerous, politically 
active and that the Western mentality is gaining ground, especially so 
among the younger generation, who share the Western values of democracy 
and human rights. 
Contemporary Turkish history depicts a continuous struggle between 
the authoritarianism of a robust state and democratic ideals. In terms of 
the rule of law and human rights, recent developments in the country 
make the authoritarian trend evident, something which creates problems 
in EU-Turkey relations. We believe that a stronger democratic rule in 
the country would step up Ankara’s progress towards EU membership. 
In order to achieve its desired integration with the EU, Turkey will 
have to introduce European values and make more consistent efforts at 
democratisation.
Turkey is not a European state. It is situated on the crossroads between 
Europe and Asia, which is a defi nitive factor in terms of its geopolitical 
signifi cance. If admitted into the EU, it is going to strengthen Europe’s 
39  K. Karpat, op.cit., p. 232.
40  Ibidem, p. 233.
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relations with rapidly growing regions such as the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, areas rich with energy resources. Turkey’s unique strategic location 
and its military potential – the second largest in NATO – will be a major 
contribution to European security. The economic situation has also to be 
taken into consideration. Although some political analysts suppose that 
the EU is reluctant to admit Turkey because of the internal political and 
economic reasons, Ankara’s economic potential should not be disregarded; 
it has lived up to the challenges created by the global economic crisis. 
Many people think that despite stable economic growth, Turkey may not 
be competitive on the EU market. If so, the already high unemployment 
is likely to increase and bring about the outfl ow of labour resources to 
the EU states. However, it may be said that after Brexit, Turkey may 
stimulate economic growth in Europe at the expense of job creation, i.e. 
the economy may support fi nding solutions to the migration problem. 
If we remember that today Turkey, “…participates in the following EU 
programmes: Erasmus+, Horizon 2020, Customs 2020, Fiscalis 2020, 
COSME (Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises) and EASI (Employment and Social Innovation). Since 2019 
it has also participated in the European Solidarity Corps programme. 
Turkey participates in the European Environmental Agency, the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and the 
Civil Protection Mechanism”.41 It creates hope in terms of penetration of 
the European culture, education, science, and mentality into the Turkish 
population. The expectations are further boosted by the EU stance that: 
“We have a chance still to redirect our relations. The EU extends an open 
hand to Turkey hoping it will seize it”.42 By this, the EU proves that it is 
not a closed community, is free from racial and religious prejudices and is 
ready to bring the Islamic world closer to democratic values and human 
rights, fundamental to a single Europe. 
Therefore, for purely pragmatic reasons and mutual interests, both Turkey 
and the EU should carry on their partnership and for all the controversial 
developments, and take steps towards a closer collaboration based on the 
defi ned criteria. Otherwise, a positive agenda43 could prove to be unattainable 
and a waste of time in an already long-drawn-out EU membership attempt.




43  N. Demiral, Positive agenda for Turkey-European Union relations: what will it bring 
or what will it take, “Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences”, no. 143/2014, p. 1011, 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.07.545.
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